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Today the black is protected by a host of civil rights laws. But the
forces of discrimination are still strong.
-Mr. Justice Douglas concurring in
Jones v. Mayer.'
[Industrial peace] would hardly be attained if a substantial mi-
nority of the craft were denied the right to have their interests
considered at the conference table and if the final result of the bar-
gaining process were to be the sacrifice of the interests of the
minority by the action of a representative chosen by the majority.
The only recourse of the minority would be to strike, with the
attendant interruption of commerce, which the [Railway Labor]
Act seeks to avoid.
-Chief Justice Stone in Steele v.
Louisville & N. R. Co.
2
[T]here can be no separate answers. No white answers. No black
answers.
-UAW International Executive Board,.
Black workers, ignoring the justifications provided in the past for
discrimination, are today less willing to tolerate a position of sub-
ordination in the house of labor. The willingness of workers to
"down tools" in protest against racial discrimination, coupled with an
abrasive "black power" rhetoric, has clearly caught the unions off
guard. Racial strife comes as a somewhat bitter surprise to the rela-
tively progressive industrial unions with large Negro memberships.
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Black Power in the Unions
Its fuiy and anger promise to leave none of the labor organizations in
the craft and industrial sectors unscathed.5 In the skilled crafts, "black
unions" have been organized outside of the traditional AFL structure-
attempting to secure for blacks some of the many jobs created by con-
struction within the ghetto community. 0 Since blacks are excluded
from most leadership positions in both craft and industrial unions and
have a disproportionately small representation at the staff level,7 the
New Militants, 92 MoNTmy LAB. Rzv. 20 (1969); Widick, Minority Power Through Unions,
Tim NATION 206, September 8, 1969; Bernstein, Fervor of Racial Protest Starting to Press
Unions, Denver Post, June 15, 1969, § J., at 1; Raskin, Labor and Blachs: The Unions
Wear Two Faces Where Race is Involved, The N.Y. Times, September 7, 1969, Sec. 4;
p. 4, col. 2. Stetson, Negro Members Are Challenging Union Leaders, N.Y. Times, June
29, 1969, at 37, col. 2. For an example of the UAW reaction to black militant organiza-
dons in and near Detroit such as the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement (DRUM),
see Kerwin, Mazey Calls Black Militant Violence Great Peril to UAiW, Detroit News,
March 16, 1969, at 4B, col. 1. However, "[t]hough DRUM exemplifies only an extreme
fringe element, the forces that gave rise to it are at work in plants across the country.
These forces include an expansion in the ranks of Negro blue.collar workers an awakening
of black employees' ambitions, a militancy in their demands and an alleged lag in
response by unions and management." Gannon, Blaoc Unionists: Militant Negroes Press
for a Stronger Voice in the Labor Movement, Wall Street Journal, November 29, 1968,
at 1, col. 1.
5. In the industrial unions, a minority of black workers can disrupt, at least temporar-
ily, the entire operation. In Mahwah, New Jersey, for example, a walkout by approximately
500 Negro workers, lead by the United Black Brothers of Mahwah Ford who claimed to
represent all 1700 black workers at the plant, temporarly closed the plant. Approximately
58% of the 4 pam. production line cnsisted of Negroes. The UAW unsuccessfully urged
the workers to return to work. See Waggoner, Ford Plant Shut in Racial Dispute, N.Y.
Times, April 29, 1969, at 28, cl. 1; Detroit Free Press, April 26, 1969. at 6B. See also
Chrysler Corporation v. Baker, Cil No. 113-761 (Mich. Circuit Court, July 16, 1963);
Owens, Black Unionists Posing Chrysler Wildcat Threat, Detroit Free Press, August 16,
1968, at 3A; N.Y. Times, July 4, 1968, at 8, cal. 2; Detroit Free Press, January 28, 1969,
at 9A; Ke-win, UAW Action Promised to Militants, Detroit News, Febr 11, 1969, at 8;
Detroit Free Press, February 11, 1969, at 6A. See especially Flint, UAW Bachs G.M. on
Negro Hiring, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1967, at 53, col. 1.
6. See Corner, Blacks Remain on Building Job in Interunion Truce, The Detroit News,
November 21, 1968, at 10B; Herbers, infra; Hill, supra note 4; Detroit Free Press,
June 11, 1969, at 11C; Kerwin, Union Rivalry on Project is Threat to "Black Local," The
Detroit News, November 19, 1968; Orr, Building-Trade Jobs Elude Negroes, Detroit Free
Press, December 26, 1968, at 3.
It is also unlikely that black communities will take kindly to all-white construction
crews working in the midst of black unemployment. See Gould, The Negro Revolution
and Trade Unionism, in 114 CoNG. Rc. 726 (daily ed. July 31, 1968) (remarks of Rep.
Ryan); Flint, Detroit Building Trades Agree on New Pacts to Spur Housing, N.Y. Times.
June 4, 1969, at 22, col. 1; N.Y. Times, March 31, 1968, at 77, col. 1; Herbers, Model
Cities Struggle: Black Jobless vs. Unions, N.Y. Times, April 3, 1969, at 41; Robbins,
Building Union Aids Mass Housing Drive, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1969, at 1, col. 8.
See also Address of George Romney, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, to
Fourteenth Nat'l Legislative Conference, AFL-CIO Building & Construction Trades
Dept., May 12, 1969; The Report of the President's Commission on Urban Housing 169.71
(1968); Givens, Job Security in the Building Industry-A High Quality of Low-Rent
Housing, 18 LABOR L.J. 468 (1967).
7. See note 4 supra. See also Steelworkers Debate Blac Representation, 91 hfoirrm,
LAB REV. 16 (1968); Owens, UAW's Blacks Seek Powers, Detroit Free Press, September 80,
1968, at 3; N.Y. Times, February 27, 1967, at 16, col. 1.
At the same time, blacks have made inroads into some unions' leadership. In 1962, the
United Automobile Workers elected a Negro Board Member-at-Large, and, more recently,
the first elected Regional Director-Board Member has been elected. N.Y. Times, August
1, 1968, at 19, col. 8; Owens, Negro Is Pilot For 74,000-member UAW Region, Detroit
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struggle has often taken the form of a rank-and-file revolt against the
men at the top.8 The inclusion of no-discrimination clauses in union
contracts has been of little significance. Both white union leaders and
company officials, insensitive in many cases to undesirable working
conditions which affect blacks, have not stressed implementation of the
clauses. Tension is particularly acute where unions like the United
Steelworkers insist upon defending seniority systems which have
harmed black workers in the past and continue to do so." In such strug-
gles for racial justice in unions, the wildcat strike and picketing may
be an appealing weapon for the minority.
The National Labor Relations Board and the courts, faced with
self-help measures by those against whom discrimination has been prac-
ticed, are beset by conflicting and at times ambiguous public policies.
On the one hand, the National Labor Relations Act establishes a
framework of exclusive bargaining representatives for all workers10 and
a policy opposed to work stoppages which bypass the more peaceful
Free Press, August 15, 1968, at 2E. Some of the plants where the greatest amount of
conflict between the UAW and black workers has taken place have elected black officials.
UAW International Executive Board Letter, supra note 3. However, the United Steel-
workers has not been nearly as successful in this regard. Loftus, Steel Union Gets a Iteblic
on Race, N.Y. Times, August 24, 1968, at 23, col. 1; Detroit News, August 21, 1968, at 8A.
Subsequent to the United Steelworkers Convention, the first Negro candidate ran for
the United Steelworkers executive board and lost. The candidate blamed black unionists'"apathy" for his defeat since he tallied 40% of the total vote but didn't win the support
he expected in heavily black locals. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 18, 1969, at 1, col. 5,
See, however, Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1969, at 4, col. 2, which indicates that the
Alliance for Labor Action, composed of United Automobile Workers and the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters is forming a new union to be called the National
Council of Wholesale, Retail, Office and Processing Workers of America, which will have
black leadership.
It seems clear that, in some instances, unreasonable requirements for eligibility for
office which may violate the Landrum-Griffin Act have a discriminatory effect on the
ability of black workers to be elected to office. See Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Etm-
ployees Union, 391 US. 492 (1968); Wirtz v. National Maritime Union of America, 284
F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); aff'd, 399 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968); Hill, supra note 4. More-
over, the problem of black representation in desegregated and merged locals promises to
be raised under Title VII. Cf. United States v. Local 198, United Papermakers (Civil
Action No. 68205, Section B, September, 1968) (On file at Wayne State University Law
Library); Chicago Federation of Musicians, Local 10 v. American Federation of Musicians,
57 LRRM 2227 (N.D. ll. 1964); Daye v. Tobacco Workers, 234 F. Supp. 815 (D.D.C. 1901).
The Court has attempted to thwart any dilution in Negro voting strength in administering
the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 541
(1969).
8. See Gould, Non-Governmental Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 20
SYRACUSE L. Rav. 865 (1969).
9. See, e.g., Whitfield v. United Steelworkers of America, 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir,),
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959); United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 70 LRRM 2131 (N.D,
Ala. 1968). On racial discrimination by unions, see generally H. CArToN ?4 G. MITCIIUL,
BLACK WORKERS AND THE NEW UNIONS (1939); M. SovERN, LEGAL RMThiNTS ON RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966); R. MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR
(1965); H. NORTHRUP, ORGANZED LABOR AND TmE NEGRO (1944); S. SPro & A. HAuRS, THn
BLACK WoRERS (1936); THm NEGRO AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MovEMENr (J. Jacobson
ed. 1968).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
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and supposedly rational machinery of impartial grievance arbitration.1'
At the same time, the Supreme Court's holding in New Negro Alliance
v. Sanitary Grocery Co.12 would appear to give economic pressure
against racial discrimination in employment at least equal standing
with the ordinary labor-management dispute. The Court, holding that
picketing to force the employment of blacks was a "labor dispute"
within the Norris-LaGuardia Act (and thus could not be enjoined in
a federal court), 3 stated:
The desire for fair and equitable conditions of employment on
the part of persons of any race, color, or persuasion, and the re-
moval of discriminations against them by reason of their race or
religious beliefs is quite as important to those concerned as fair-
ness and equity in terms and conditions of employment can be to
trade or craft unions or any form of labor organization or associa-
tion. Race discrimination by an employer may reasonably be
deemed more unfair and less excusable than discrimination against
workers on the ground of union affiliation. There is no justifica-
tion in the apparent purposes or the expressed terms of the [Norris-
LaGuardia] Act for limiting its definition of labor disputes and
cases arising therefrom by excluding those which arise with respect
to discrimination in terms and the conditions of employmlent based
upon differences of race or color. 14
The passage of a federal fair employment practices statute in opposi-
tion to racial discrimination (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964),'5 may be seen as supporting self-help measures.10 At the same
11. Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the applica-
tion of interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. The [Federal
Mediation and Conciliation] Service is directed to make its conciliation and mediation
services available in the settlement of such grievance disputes only as a last resort and
in exceptional cases.
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
12. 503 U.S. 552 (1938).
13. Act of March 23, 1932, c. 90 § 13, 47 Stat. 73, 29 U.S.C. §§ 113(a), 113(b), and 113(c)
(1964).
14. 803 U.S. at 561.
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2009 e-2 (19I). For other weapons
against racial discrimination in employment, see Exec. Order No. 112-16, 3 C.F.R. § 579,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. MI 1967); Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409 (196S). In connection with
Jones in the employment area, compare Dobbins v. Local 212 LB.E.W., 292 F. Supp. 413,
69 LR.RM 2313 (S.D. Ohio 1968), with Waters v. Wisconsin Steelworkers of International
Harvester Co., 71 LRRM 2886 (NI). II. 1969); Harrison v. American Can Co., 2 FEP Cases
1 (S.D. Ala. 1969). The development of a new constitutional protection of the right to
join unions for public employees is of some importance to black workers in the South
without statutory protection. See AFSCME v. Woodward, 70 LRRM 2317 (8th Cir. 1969);
Atkns v. City of Charlotte, 70 LRRM 2732 (W.D.N.C. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 59
CCH Lab. Cas. 13, 219 (7th Cir. 1968).
16. The constitutional avenues for self-help measures to be used by the dvil rights
movement in pursuit of such goals as desegregation of public education is treated in
H. KALv-N, TUE NwRo AND= TE Fnsr AmEnat.r (1966).
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time, the statute's broad prohibitive language and the availability of
statutory machinery to implement these prohibitions would appear to
make such measures unnecessary. In fact, however, statutory sanctions
provided by the act have proven ineffective. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, which administers the statute,17 is not af-
forded cease and desist powers,'8 and the individual usually must
vindicate his rights through burdensome and expensive court action.
The Commission must depend on a conciliation process which has
proven fairly unsuccessful to date. Suits to enforce the union's duty
of fair representation, which can be brought before the NLRB and the
courts, and the various remedies created by the NLRB in response,
have proven similarly ineffective.' 9
Leaving aside the policy conflicts which Title VII may create, it is
clear that its passage reflects a general distrust of arbitration and the
bargaining table insofar as the handling of racial discrimination
grievances is concerned. In view of this distrust and the proliferation
of wildcat strikes and picketing, the question arises as to whether spe-
cial machinery is needed to cope with the racial grievance; i.e., whether
in terms of labor policy there are "separate" answers for the trouble-
some problems of minority action to combat racial discrimination.
This article attempts to explore the problems which arise because of
racial discrimination in employment, in the context of Title VII as
well as other civil rights legislation, the National Labor Relations Act,
and the first amendment.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(3)(9)(a) (1964).
18. The Commission lacks cease and desist powers to enforce the statute and is totally
dependent upon a conciliation process which itself is impaired by unrealistically small
appropriations. See JoBs & CIVIL RIGrs (Report for US. Civil Rights Commission pre-
pared by Brookings Institute, 1969); Statement of Herbert Hill, Labor Secretary for
NAACP, December 5, 1968, DAmLy LABo REPoRT No. 237, E-I (December 5, 1968); Note,
Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REv. 834 (1969).
Even under the National Labor Relations Act where the Board, under Section 10, har
enforcement powers, the argument has not been made that the availability of statutory
machinery impliedly limits self-help measures. Of course, Congress was careful to note that
the passage of the Act (Section 13) did not in any way impair the right to strike. Cf.
NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 362 US. 274 (1960).
President Nixon has recently proposed legislation which would broaden the authority
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See N.Y. Times, August 9, 1969,
at 1, col. 5. Compare the legislation introduced by Senator Philip A. Hart, S.2029, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
19. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 US. 171 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 US. 335 (1964),
Conley v. Gibson, 355 US. 41 (1957); Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 US. 892 (1956), Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 US. 330 (1953); Graham v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen,
329 US. 232 (1949); Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen, 323 US. 210 (1944): Steele
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 US. 192 (1944); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v.
NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 US. 837 (1967); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 24Q (1965); independent Metal Workers Union,, Local 1, 147
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I. Arbitration
The National Labor Relations Act of 193520 codified the principles
on which modem labor relations are based. Congress there established
the doctrine that a union which possesses a majority status in an
appropriate unit of workers21 is entitled to be the exclusive bargaining
representative for all employees in that unit.2 The Supreme Court,
in its landmark Steelworker Trilogy,2 later interpreted Section 10124
-which had been passed as part of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amend-
ments-as manifesting a Congressional preference for the use of
voluntary grievance arbitration in exchange for the commitment of
labor to refrain from striking for the duration of a labor contract.25
The exclusive bargaining agent concept has been tempered some-
what by the statutory proviso that "any individual, employee or group
of employees [has] the right at any time to present grievances to the
employer and to have such grievances adjusted."20 In such cases, the
bargaining agent must be given the option of being present during
adjustment negotiations and adjustments must not be inconsistent with
the labor contract.
In the face of these qualifications, the Supreme Court has held
that employer negotiations with individual employees is "subversive
of the mode of collective bargaining which the statute has ordained
. "27' Consequently, the unions have exercised a near plenary power
in determining whether an employee's grievance should be processed
through arbitration. 28 The Court has been motivated here not only by
what it considers to be the proper application of exclusivity to labor
arbitration, but also by a desire not to disturb a system which it
regards as a workable substitute for industrial strife. -0
NLRB 1573 (1964); 1 Iranda Fuel Co., 140 NLRB 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963); Herring, The 'Fair Representation" Doctrine: An Effective
Weapon Against Union Racial DIscrimination?, 24 MD. L. R. 113 (1964).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1964) [hereinafter referred to as the National Labor Rela-
tions Act].
21. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
22. 29 US.G. § 159(a) (1964).
23. United Steelworkers v. Warrior S: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
24. 29 U.S.C. 301 (1964).
25. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 253 US. 448, 455 (1957). The no-strike
obligation can be implied as the result of a broad arbitration clause. See Local 174,
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
27. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 221 US. 678, 6S4 (1944). Accord, J. I. Cas Co.
v. NLRB, 321 US. 332 (1944).
28. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 US. 171 (1967).
29. See notes 18 and 19 supra.
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Yet the Court's veneration for the arbitration process has its limits.
Although, generally speaking, employees must exhaust contractual
grievance procedures before bringing a contract action, 0 the Court
held in Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. 81 that dissident
workers alleging racial discrimination in promotion could proceed
directly into court even though their complaint alleged a contract
violation as well as discrimination. Glover cannot be read to say un-
equivocally that certain kinds of racial discrimination grievances are
exempt from the exhaustion requirements: 32 the facts presented to the
Court included allegations that the union and company had been
extremely hostile to the black plaintiffs and their grievances. Moreover,
the Court stressed the fact that the plaintiffs had "called upon" the
union to take action in regard to their grievance, thus attempting to
30. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). But see United States v.
Georgia Power Co., 71 LRRM 2784 (N.D. Ga. 1969); King v. Georgia Power Co., 69
LRRM 2094 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Reese v. Atlantic Steel Co., 282 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ga. 1967);
Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), reversed, 2 FEB Cases 121
(7th Cir. 1969); Dent v. L.S.F. Ry., 265 F. Supp. 56 (NJD. Ala. 1967), rev'd on other grounds,
406 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1969). However, in none of the above noted cases did the plaintiff
accuse the defendant both of racial discrimination and of a contract violation, which
could appropriately be handled by grievance-arbitration machinery. Where the allegation
of contract violation as well as discrimination has been made, Glover has been distin-
guished on the grounds that futility was evidenced in that specific case. See Waters v.
Wisconsin Steelworkers of International Harvester Co., 71 LRRM 2886 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
Cf. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968);
Brady v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1018
(1969).
The Court has stated:
[B]ecause these contractual remedies have been devised and are often controlled by
the union and the employer, they may well prove unsatisfactory or unworkable for
the individual grievant. The problem then is to determine under what circumstanceg
the individual employee may obtain judicial review of his breach.of-contract claim
despite his failure to secure relief through the contractual remedial procedures.
An obvious situation in which the employee should not be limited to the exclusive
remedial procedures established by the contract occurs when the conduct of the
employer amounts to a repudiation of those contractual procedures ....
We think that another situation when the employee may seek judicial enforcement
of his contractual rights arises if, as is true here, the union has sole power under the
contract to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure, and if, as is alleged
here, the employee-plaintiff has been prevented from exhausting his contractual
remedies by the union's wrongful refusal to process the grievance. It is true that the
employer in such a situation may have done nothing to prevent exhaustion of the
exclusive contractual remedies to which he agreed in the collective bargaining agree.
ment. But the employer has committed a wrongful discharge in breach of that
agreement [in a Vaca-type case), a breach which could be remedied through the
grievance process to the employee-plaintiff's benefit were it not for the union's breach
of its statutory duty of fair representation to the employee. To leave the employee
remediless in such circumstances would in our opinion, be a great injustice.
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-186 (1967).
31. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
32. E.g., "[I]he attempt to exhaust contractual remedies required under Maddo.v, is
easily satisfied by petitioner's repeated complaints to company and union officials and at
no time should consuming formalities be demanded of them." 393 U.S. at 331 (1969).
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exhaust their contractual remedies.3 3 Since the Glover exception to the
exhaustion requirement is based on the Court's conclusion that the
black workers' efforts to employ the union-management procedures
would be "wholly futile," one wonders whether a good many racial
discrimination grievances can be distinguished from non-racial
grievances for which the contract procedures were created. This specu-
lation, if valid-and the typicality of the Glover fact situation would
argue for such validity-, implies that normal arbitration procedures
are not adequate fairly to handle grievances involving charges with
elements of racial discrimination.
Elsewhere, I have argued that normal arbitration procedures, which
have proven effective in solving many types of grievances and avoiding
labor strife, suffer from certain institutional shortcomings that render
them totally incapable of dealing with the racial problems that beset
the labor movement today.34 A brief restatement of those conclusions
should provide insights into the institutional framework in which the
wildcat strikes and picketing by racial minorities will be discussed
below.
One difficulty with submitting racial discrimination grievances to
arbitration is that the union and employer, who select the arbitrator,
are quite often both alleged to have participated in the discrimination.
While impartial arbitration has an integrity which makes it superior to
devices such as labor-management committees, it is difficult to ignore
its responsiveness to the parties to the agreement under which the
arbitration takes place. Black workers and their allies have no standing
to intervene in the arbitration proceeding,35 and, moreover, it is labor
and management-not rebellious minority employees-who will de-
cide whether the arbitrator is selected to arbitrate in the future. This
is not to cast ethical aspersions on arbitrators, but only to highlight
33. The Court pointed out that in previous cases the exhaustion rule was relaxed
to the extent that the employee need only have attempted to exhaust the available
remedies and been prevented from doing so by the union. T.93 U.S. at 3S0-31. Sec Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Mitaddox, 379 US. 650 (1965); note
30 supra.
34. Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U.
PA. L. R v. 40 (1969).
35. The leading case is Acuff v. United Papermakers, 404 F-2d 169 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 1466 (1969) (Mr. Justice Black was of the opinion that certiorari
should have been granted). See generally Fleming, Some Problems of Duc Process and
Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 13 ST'.AN. L. REv. 235 (1961); Gould, Labor Arbitra-
tion of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 40 (1969); Hansloue,
Individual Rights in Collective Labor Relations, 45 CoRNELL L.Q. 25 (1959); Rosen, The
Individual Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Lool at the Problem, 24 MD.
L. Ray. 233 (1964); Summers, Individual Rights in Collcctive Agreements and Arbitration,
37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 362 (1962).
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an institutional fact of life:30 each arbitration process serves those who
have created it.
This responsiveness of the arbitrator to the labor-management team
precludes the formulation of "affirmative action" remedies for black
workers. Even where a contract contains a no-discrimination clause,37
as well as a separability provision which provides that an illegal clause
does not taint the remainder of the contract,8s it is doubtful that an
effective remedy can be formed which does not controvert some ex-
pectation of the parties.39
Arbitrators are also reluctant to rely on public laws such as Title
VII in issuing awards since they have no particular competence in
this realm.40 Indeed, the Supreme Court's requirement that the arbi-
trator maintain a measure of fidelity to the contract terms41 gives legal
justification to this rationale. Even in those instances where there is a
clear conflict between civil rights legislation and the privately nego-
tiated contract,42 the existing arbitration system does not impel opti-
36. See Gould, Non-Governmental Remedies for Employment Discritninattol, 20
SYRACUSE L. R.Ev. 865 (1969); Note, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALt L.J.
1191 (1968); Note, Federal Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 7s
YALE L.J. 1215 (1964).
37. See Brief for Petitioner at 14, NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery Ltd., S94 M,2d 1
(9th Cir. 1965).
38. The unanswered question is whether, even though the parties clearly intended
to act in accordance with the law by negotiating a separability clause which presumes
that the illegal clause will be void and not relied upon by the parties, they intended to
bestow this function upon an arbitrator or a court. See generally UAW Local No, 085 v.
W.N. Chace, 262 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Mich. 1966); Blumrosen, Public Policy Considerations
in Labor Arbitration Cases, 14 Rrromns L. REv. 217 (1960); Denau, Three Problems in
Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REv. 427, 439-47 (1969); Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary
Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1963); Note, Arbitrability of Labor
Disputes, 47 VA. L. REv. 1183 (1961).
39. Most arbitrators, for example, would be going astray in this regard by revising
discriminatory seniority systems in a manner which would antagonize white incumbents
who have benefited from segregated job patterns. On the nature of such practices, see
generally Cooper & Sobel, Seniority and Testing Under Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1598 (1969;
Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and Its Implications, 47
TEXAS L. REv. 1039 (1969); Gould, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 How. L.J. 1 (1967).
40. But see Howlett, The Arbitrator, NLRB and the Court, National Academy of
Arbitrators, Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting (BNA, Inc. 1967). See also Platt,
The Relationship between Arbitration and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1961, 8
GA. L. REV. 398 (1969); Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Arbitration,
National Academy of Arbitrators, Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting (DNA, Inc.
1967).
41. He [the arbitrator] may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his
award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity of this obligation,
courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
42. See, e.g., Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 NLRB 312 (1964), enforcement
granted, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967), where the collective
bargaining agreement was interpreted by the parties in a racially discriminatory manner
and, pursuant to the doctrine of past practice, a conflict between a law and contract aros.
See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 45 Lab. Arb. 240 (1965).
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mism as to the arbitrators' reaction.43 This recognition of the
conflicting roles forced upon the union where racial cleavages within
the membership have resulted in strife of various types and the black
workers' distrust of the union where racial grievances have existed for
some time with the union's passive or active cooperation has serious
implications for labor law policy beyond the realm of arbitration.:4
II. Racial Discrimination and Work Stoppages
The National Labor Relations Act prohibits employer retaliation
in the form of discharge and discipline against workers who protest
through the walkout what they regard to be poor working conditions. 3
But when unions negotiate a collective agreement which prohibits
such protests through, for example, a no-strike clause,40 the walkout
becomes unprotected and the worker is exposed to the above-noted
penalties. The Supreme Court has limited the ability of employers to
discipline workers even where no-strike clauses exist. In Mastro Plastics
v. NLRB, 47 the Court held that a no-strike clause could not be read
to prohibit a strike which was called in response to unfair labor
practices by the employer.48 The Afastro Plastics opinion noted that
43. Of course, there are situations such as discharge cases where the union, albeit
prompted to process the grievance due to fear of a duty of fair representation suit by the
worker, moves for reinstatement vigorously and where the arbitrator, operating under a
"just cause" provision in the agreement, can comfortably insert Title AMI substantive law
notions into the general language of the clauses. Here, some of the assumptions noted
above have less validity but the skepticism about no-discrimination clauses expressed by
Judge Wright has general applicability. one can find "that such a clause meant little if a
company would not also work to correct individual grievances." United Packing House v.
NLRB, 70 LRIRM 2489, 2492 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
44. The implications within the realm of arbitration lead inevitably to the conclusion
that, absent even more drastic change in public institutions, workers alleging racial dis-
crimination by both union and management should be permitted trilateral arbitration
procedures in order to reflect the actual character of the conflict. Sec Gould, supra note 34,
at 46-52.
45. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 US. 9 (1962). The statutory basis is
provided in 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a) (1964):
Employees shall have the right to selforganization form, join, or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively the representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall have the right to refrain from any or all such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement re-
quiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as author-
ized in section 8(a)(3) of this title.
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-() to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ....
46. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1938). Cf. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 US. 95 (1962). However, a more limited no-strike obligation will protect the walk-
out. See Ford Motor Co., 131 NLRB 1462 (1961); Young Spring & Wire Corp., ISS NLRB
643 (1962); Mid-West Metallic Prods., Inc., 121 NLRB 1317 (1958).
47. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
48. The no-strike clause could not, however, be read to specifically preclude its applica-
tion to the situation involved in Mastro Plastics.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 79: 46, 1969
such unfair labor practices were destructive of the "foundations" of
the negotiated labor contract. 4 This language has convinced the
NLRB, over the strong objections of member Fanning, that the Mastro
Plastics exception to the unprotected nature of no-strike violations was
to be afforded only where the employer engaged in "serious, unfair
labor practices."5 0
Even without the presence of a labor contract or a no-strike clause,
where a union is on the scene as the exclusive representative, some
strikes, called without union authorization, are unprotected within
the meaning of the Act. In NLRB v. Draper Corp.,5 1 the Fourth Circuit
stated the proposition in its boldest terms. Emphasizing the concept
of exclusivity and the disruption which unauthorized stoppages can
cause in interstate commerce, the court stated:
Even though the majority of the employees in an industry may
have selected their bargaining agent and the agent may have been
recognized by the employer, there can be no effective bargaining
if small groups of employees are at liberty to ignore the bargaining
agency thus set up, take particular matters into their own hands
and deal independently with the employer. The whole purpose
of the act is to give to the employees as a whole, through action
of a majority, the right to bargain with the employer with respect
to such matters as wages, hours and conditions of work....
The employees must act through the voice of the majority or
the bargaining agent chosen by the majority. Minority groups
must acquiesce in the action of the majority and the bargaining
agent they have chosen; and, just as the minority has no right to
enter into separate bargaining arrangements with the employer,
so it has no right to take independent action to interfere with the
course of bargaining which is being carried on by the duly au-
thorized bargaining agent chosen by the majority. The proviso to
49. 350 US. at 281.
50. Arlan's Department Store, 133 NLRB 802, 807 (1961) (emphasis added).
51. NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944). See also NLRB v. Serv-Air, Inc.,
69 LRRM 2476 (10th Cir. 1968); Rubber Rolls, Inc. v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 71 (3d Cir. 1967);
Packers Hide Ass'n. v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Cactus Petroleum, Inc.,
355 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. R.C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964), Western
Contracting Corp. v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Kearney & Trecker
Corp., 237 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.
1963); NLRB v. Lundy Mfg. Corp., 316 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 895
(1963); NLRB v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 217 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1954); Simmons,
Inc. v. NLRB, 315 F.2d 143 (1st Cir. 1963); Confectionery & Tobacco Drivers Union v.
NLRB, 312 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1963); Plasti-Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1960);
NLRB v. Sunset Minerals, Inc., 211 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1954); Harnischfeger Corp. v. NLRB,
207 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 212 (5th Cir, 1953);
NLRB v. J.. Case Co., 198 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Deena Artwear, Inc., 198
F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 217 (9th Cir 1951).
See generally Cox, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 319, 332 (1951):
Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Re-
lations Act, 52 Coarja.L L.Q. 672 (1967).
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section 9... preserving to individuals or groups of employees the
right to present grievances to the employer, negatives by necessary
inference the right on their part to call strikes for the purpose of
influencing the bargaining being carried on by the dosen rep-
resentatives of all the employees.5
2
The NLRB has attempted to proclaim its fidelity to Draper3 while
at the same time holding that stoppages called without the union's
authorization do not subvert majority rule where their objectives
coincide with those held by the exclusive representative, 4 It is with
this background as precedent that the Board dealt with its first racial
discrimination walkout. In Tanner Motor Livery Ltd.,' two white
drivers employed by the company were active in civil rights organiza-
tions, and demanded that a black driver be hired. Subsequent to the
demand, one of the drivers was fired and filed a timely grievance under
the labor contract. The union first decided against processing the
grievance, and a subsequent union-company panel proceeding ruled
against his reinstatement. Shortly after the discharge, the second em-
ployee joined a picket line outside the establishment with a sign which
bore the emblem "Jim Crow Shop." He was quickly fired.
The Trial Examiner found that both employees were discharged
because of their protest against the alleged discriminatory hiring prac-
tices of the employer. He determined, however, that such practices
were not an unfair labor practice under the Act. A unanimous Board
reversed. Citing New Negro Alliance, ; the Board held that the workers
involved had engaged in protected concerted activity within the mean-
ing of the Act:
It is true... that not every concerted activity in furtherance of a
labor dispute is protected by Section 7. However, an employer's
hiring policies and practices are of vital concern to employees in-
asmuch as such policies and practices inherently affect terms and
conditions of employment. Thus, in our opinion, the concerted
activities of employees in protest of what they consider unfair
52. NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1944).
53. See Consul Lee A. Co., 175 NLRB No. 93 (1969); Gould, The Status of Unauthorized
and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 52 Corr. L.Q. 672 (1967).
54. I have taken the position that union involvement and notification from union
officials are a prerequisite for the exercise of protected rights under Section 7 v'here an
exclusive bargaining representative has been selected by the employees. Id. at 696.697.
However, as indicated here, I would not apply sud standards to disputes which have their
origin in protest concerning racially discriminatory practices. Public policy and statutory
considerations concerning racial equality argue for a different approach to this problem.
55. 148 NLRB 1402 (1964), remanded, 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965), aff'd in Supplemental
Decision and Order, 166 NLRB No. 35 (1967).
56. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 903 U.S. 552 (1938).
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hiring policies and practices are clearly within their Section 7
right "to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded for the Board to consider
the question of whether employees who protested discriminatory hiring
practices were required to act through their collective bargaining
representative where the representative had negotiated a contract with
the employer. s The court said that this question, "stated another way,"
was "to what extent does Section 9(a) [providing for exclusive bar-
gaining authority] limit or remove the protection afforded by Section
7?" 9 The court expressed the view that the purposes of the Act, which
in large part support the principle of collective bargaining, might be
undermined if the employees could resort to picket line activity in
connection with "grievances" which were to be settled in a "proscribed
manner," i.e. by arbitration.
The Board on remand stated that the record did not indicate
whether the employees had attempted to act through their exclusive
bargaining representative. 0 They found it unnecessary to decide
whether the employees were filing a "grievance" under the §9(a)
proviso0' or whether they were attempting to bargain individually
with the employer. Holding that the employees were not "acting in
derogation of their established bargaining agent by seeking to elim-
inate what they deemed to be a morally unconscionable, if not an un-
lawful, condition of employment, 01 2 the Board stated:
[T]he Board cannot presume or conclude that, contrary to the
course being urged by [the discharged employees], ... the Union
knowingly would have taken the unlawful position that it would
refuse to represent Negro drivers fairly if hired. Rather, we must
assume that these employees were acting in accord with, and in
furtherance of, the lawful position of their collective-bargaining
agent. For the Board to find, therefore, that the employees' other-
wise protected concerted activities herein were rendered unpro-
tected by virtue of an existing collective-bargaining agreement
between the Union and the Respondent would be offensive to
public policy.63
57. Tanner Motor Livery Ltd., 148 NLRB 1402, 1404 (1964).
58. 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965).
59. Id. at 3.
60. See p. 51 supra.
61. 166 NLRB No. 35 at 2-3 (slip opinion), 65 LRR.M 1502, 1503 (1967).
62. 65 LRRM at 1503.
63. Id. But see The Emporium, Trial Examiner's Decision, October 24, 1969, Caw
No. 20-CA-5304. Daily Labor Report, Oct. 24, 1969, No. 207 D-1.
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The Board did not hold that the employer was in fact guilty of dis-
crimination in hiring or that a violation of a civil rights law had oc-
curred.64 Consistent with its general refusal to examine the reason-
ableness of employee protests in the walkout context,c5 the Board
found only that there was a reasonable basis for believing that the
concern of the two workers was genuine, in the sense that it was not
"grounded on contrived or flimsy evidence."610 The evidence presented
was the complete absence of black employees in the defendant's con-
cern. Given a reasonable basis for belief, the activity was dedared to
be protected within the meaning of the Act.
The Tanner decision reflects both: (1) the Board's unrealistic and
rarefied approach to wildcat strikes in all contexts; and (2) its inability
to articulate the unique role which racial discrimination grievances
play in our collective bargaining system. The Board, with some ap-
proval from the courts, 67 assumes that if an identity between the objec-
tives of the union and unauthorized strikers can be found or inferred,
the stoppage is not subversive of the collective bargaining process and
is consequently protected by the Draper rule. 8 This has led the Board
to the completely erroneous conclusion that a mere disagreement
about the timing of a strike, as distinguished from its substantive ob-
jectives, does not destroy the rapport between the union and the
striking workers.0 But the question of timing economic action, as the
Court has noted in the context of lock-outs, is critical in the strategy
of both the union and the company and specifically in the union's
decision to use or withhold the strike weapon. 0 If the trade union
leadership believes that September is the best time to shut dowm auto
companies because the model changeover imposes greater economic
pressure and therefore increases the likelihood that management will
settle at union terms, dissidents who choose to walk out in July are at
64. Id.
65. See e.g., NLRB v. Marshall Car Wheel & Foundry Co., 218 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1955);
NLRB v. Cowles Publishing Co., 214 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Southern Silk
Mills, Inc., 209 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1953); Modern Motors, Inc., v. NLRB, 198 F.2d 925
(8th Cir. 1952); Carter Carburetor Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 19-14); NLRB v.
Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942).
66. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 65 LRRf 1502, 1503. Thus far, the use of statistics as
a basis for finding discriminatory exclusion of Negroes has not found general acceptance.
See United States v. Local 58, IBEW, 70 LRRMI .019 (N.D. Ohio 1969); Dobbins v. Local
212, IBEW, 69 LRRM 2313 (S.D. Ohio 1968); United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 70 LRRMf
2131 (NfD. Ala. 1968). But see United States v. Sheet Metal Workers International
Association, 2 FEB Cases 127 (8th Cir. 1969).
67. See especially NLRB v. R. C. Can Co., 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1934).
68. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
69. R. C. Can Co., 140 NLRB 588, 596 (1l63). enforcement granted, 328 F.2d 974 (5th
Cir. 1964).
70. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 802-04 (1965).
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odds with the union's objectives. This is simply one example of the
Board's willingness to give the walkout protected status in defiance of
the realities of industrial relations.71
The Board's notion in Tanner that the fair employment activities
and picket line conduct of the two workers were "in accord with, and
in furtherance of the lawful position of their collective bargaining
agent"72 requires an even greater act of faith. It is quite clear that the
union was unenthusiastic at best about the civil rights goals of the two
workers. Although the Board found that the dismissal of the first
worker was based upon grounds which were a "pretext" for the em-
ployer's desire to rid itself of employees who took issue with hiring
policy, the union representative twice refused to vote for the worker's
reinstatement. If anything, the evidence adduced in Tanner indicates
that the union sympathized with the employer's position.
It may be argued that the union's hostility toward its civil rights
conscious members in no way establishes its hostility to the goal of
non-discrimination. It is quite possible for the union to take the most
severe measures against various types of independent action such as
wildcat strikes73 and yet be in total agreement with a policy which
would remedy the irritations or injustices which gave rise to the stop-
page. An initial problem with this approach in Tanner, however, is
the difficulty of translating this absence of hostility into the kind of
accord between the parties required by the Draper rule. Unions as well
as employers are responsible for much of the racial discrimination
which exists in the country today.74 There was no evidence in Tanner
that the international union would back up the strikers' objectives,
let alone any indication of sympathy on the part of the local. It does
not seem possible that the Board could have indulged in such an un-
justified inference in light of the pattern of employment discrimina-
tion that has been evidenced. 5
71. The Board refuses to regard a walkout as unprotected where the international
representative's "reservation concerning the walkout appears to relate to its tactical wis-
dom." R. C. Can Co., 140 NLRB 588, 596 (1963).
72. 65 LRRM 1502, 1503 (1967).
73. See Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 905 (,th Cir,), cort,
denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 IlAiry. L.
REv. 1049 (1951). See, e.g., Hofmann, UAW Takes Over Rebel Ohio Local, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 9, 1967, at 29, col. 1. Cf. Jones, Wirtz Upset by Workers' Rejection of Accords, N.Y,
Times, Jan. 3, 1967, at 16, col. 4; Raskin, Why Labor Doesn't Follow Its Leaders, N.Y.
Times, January 8, 1967, § 4, at 6, col. 1.
74. For one of the more recent authoritative statements on this subject, see Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, REPORT No. 1 (1969).
75. R. MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR (1965); M. SoVERN, LEGAL RE-
StRAINTs ON RACIAL DISCRInMNATON IN EMPLOYMENT (1966).
Moreover, despite the fact that the unions may discipline wildcatters and yet find them.
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It is particularly interesting that the holding in Tanner not only
sanctions a protected status for employees who did not proceed through
their exclusive bargaining representative, but at the same time declares
"offensive to public policy" any collective bargaining agreement ne-
gotiated by the parties which would alter this result. But if one as-
sumes, as the Board does, that the union's position was not being
undermined by the workers' independent action, the procedures out-
lined in the collective bargaining agreement would seem to be the
appropriate forum for the resolution of the dispute. The procedure
used in the case was a joint union-employer committee where both the
employer charged with discrimination and an unsympathetic union
voted against reinstatement. It is possible that the Board would have
overcome its normal suspicions regarding grievance procedures con-
trolled by the union and employer7" and found this procedure fair.
One can assume, however, that the procedural unfairness involved
would provide a sensible rationale for the Board's holding insofar as
it relates to the relevance of the collective bargaining agreement to
the dispute.7
7
The record in Tanner did not reveal whether, had this procedure
proven unfair to the Board, the parties could have turned to impartial
arbitration. 7 As previously mentioned, arbitration has serious deft-
ciencies for the resolution of racial grievances and, although this view
appears to be at odds with that held by the NLRB,70 the hollow ring
selves in agreement with their objectives, this would not be true in a case like Masfro
Plastics, where employer unfair labor practices are aimed at the union's existence. While
logically one can separate the union's response to two separate issues (the ciuse of the
stoppage and the allegedly improper conduct of the strikers), the realities of industrial
relations are that the union does not so respond in the Mastro Plastics context or uhere the
union officers find it politically unwise to do so. Thus, the union's refusal to vote for rein-
statement of the discharged grievant in Tanner may have some bearing on what the union
would do in the area of fair hiring. In any event, this fact hardly buttrw the Board's
views about the union's position on this issue.
76. However, the critical question is whether "... the procedures adopted meet normal
standards as to sufficiency, fairness and regularity" and whether there is "evidence of ir-
regularity, collusion or inadequate provisions for the taking of testimony." Denver-Chicago
Trucking Co., Inc., 132 NLRB 1416, 1421 (1961).
77. Such an approach coincides with the position taken by the Supreme Court in Glover
v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 593 US. 824 (1969). where the Court refused to re-
quire exhaustion of administrative remedies where union-employer controlled proceedings
under the Railway Labor Act were involved. See pp. 52-55 supra.
78. 148 NLRB 1402, 1410.
79. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080, 1082 (1955): The arbitration awrd will not
be set aside where the proceedings "have been fair and regular, all parties have agreed to
be bound, and the decision of the [arbitrator] is not dearly repugnant to the purposes and
policies of the Act- See also Cloverleaf Div. Adams Dairy Co., 147 NLRB 141 (1961);
Raley's Inc., 143 NLRB 256 (1963); International Harvester Co., 138 NLRB 923 (1962),
enforced sub. nor. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1964). But see A. 0. Smith
Corp., 174 NLRB No. 41(1969); Horn & Hardardt Co., 173 0NLR No. 164, 69 LRRM
1522 (1968); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 172 NLRB No. 768 (1967); Hotel Employers
Ass'n. of San Francisco, 159 NLRB 143, 148 (1966); Ford Motor Co., 131 NLRB 1462 (1961).
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of the Board's stated faith in the rapport of the union leadership with
its activist members implies that something else is at issue.
It is somewhat more likely that the Board, rather than limiting the
application of arbitration to contract disputes, desired only to exclude
a category of cases not covered by the negotiated agreement. In Tanner,
the dispute concerned discrimination in hiring. The Board, while
addressing itself to the question of whether the objectives of the union
and employees were compatible, stated that it would not presume or
conclude that "the Union knowingly would have taken the unlawful
position that it would refuse to represent Negro drivers fairly if
hired."80 It is then possible to rationalize Tanner as a case in which
the collective bargaining agreement is irrelevant to the dispute because
it does not deal with the subject matter, i.c. hiring, but rather with
conditions of employment after the employee is on the job. Inasmuch
as the industrial unions are generally unconcerned with the hiring of
employees, the contract's prohibitions against economic action would
have no meaning: the quid pro quo relationship exists only between
the no-strike clause and the benefits which are traditionally part of the
collective bargain. Following this analysis, stoppages which protest
discriminatory union hiring halls would become vulnerable because
the union would be involved in the hiring process and the use of
independent pressure would undermine exclusivity.81
The problems with this approach are manifold. The no-strike clause
often speaks in the most absolute language and obligates the employees
to refrain from economic warfare unconditionally. The Court has
stated in this context:
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and duties
of the parties. It is more than a contract; it is a generalized code
to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly
anticipate....
The mature labor agreement may attempt to regulate all
aspects of the complicated relationship, from the most crucial to
the most minute over an extended period of time.82
80. Tanner Motor Livery Ltd., 65 LRRM 1502, 1503 (1967).
81. See Hotel Employers Ass'n., 47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966). The Board, because it did not
correct Trial Examiner dicta, has unwisely permitted this approach to be moved a step
further, i.e., acceptance of the proposition that a walkout concerning a condition of em-
ployment not incorporated in the agreement is protected activity. Norfolk Conveyor, 159
NLRB 464, 468-69 (1966). See generally Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 IIALv,
L. REv. 601 (1956). Cf. B & Mvi Excavating, Inc., 155 NLRB 1152, 1160 (1966); Jacobs Manu-
facturing, 94 NLRB 1214 (1951).
82. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
578, 580 (1960).
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In regard to the no-strike question, the Court further added that "in
a very real sense everything that management does is subject to the
agreement, for either management is prohibited or limited in the
action it takes, or if not, it is protected from interference by strikes."8 3
The Court's statements are inconsistent with the proposition that the
legal status of a stoppage is determined by whether or not the issue
which triggered it was dealt with by the parties at the bargaining table.
Insofar as this rationale would weaken the no-strike clause in the con-
tract, it would come as a rude surprise to most employers who have
viewed the clause as a much firmer pledge.84
If Tanner, despite the irrationality of its arguments, stands for the
proposition that racial disputes have a unique importance in the
scheme of national labor policy, it contains a holding which deserves
support. Congress has, albeit through a statute which is thus far more
promise than accomplishment, 5 has made clear its hostility to racial dis-
crimination in employment. This commitment, coupled with the
history of deliberate bondage and racism which has been the lot of the
black worker in this country, warrants a special solicitude on the part
of administrative agencies and courts. Labor stoppages arising from
issues of racial discrimination should not be declared unprotected out
of hand simply because they are not authorized by the union or are
in defiance of the no-strike clause and peaceful procedures provided
in the collective agreement. At the same time, workers and manage-
ment deserve some stability in their economic affairs; the factory
should not become a battlefield where economic pressure is used to
settle issues unrelated to work and production. What then for the
limits within which the right to strike will be protected? And what is
the proper rationale to reach the laudable result inarticulately spon-
sored in Tanner?
The scheme of labor-management relations created by Congress is
designed to deal with factors relating to employment and production.
The use of authorized weapons such as the strike to achieve objectives
83. Id. at 583.
84. Moreover, insofar as racial problems are concerned, many of the industrial unions
are becoming increasingly enmeshed in programs for the hiring of the "disadiantaged" such
as that sponsored by the National Association of Businessmen. See N.Y. Times, May 16,
1968, at 46, col. 1; id., Mar. 21, 1968, at 46, col. 1; id., Feb. 27, 1968, at 22., col. 2; id., Feb.
25, 1968, at 1, col. 3. See also 71 LR.RM 252 (1969); 70 LRRM 247 (1969); 70 LRRM 196
(1969); 70 LRRM 152 (1969); 69 LRRM 245 (1968); 68 LRRMI 258 (1969); 68 LRR' 93
(1968).
85. For some of procedural problems which have raised havoc in the enforcement of
civil rights legislation aimed at racial discrimination, see, for instance, Jons
& Cn'L RIGHTs (Report for US. Civil Rights Commission prepared by Brookings Institute,
1969).
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unrelated or only distantly related to these factors should not be
allowed. Suppose, for example, that demands are made on General
Motors, Chrysler, and Ford that they pay reparations to black workers
because of what is alleged to be the involvement of these companies
in this nation's subjugation of Negro workers. Such a protest seemed
too generalized and unrelated to plant employment conditions-at
least in terms of the particular issues with which the National Labor
Relations Board normally deals86-to be the kind of "labor dispute"
which falls within the Congressional scheme, and which consequently
is entitled to the protection of Tanner or New Negro Alliance. The
reparations example smacks too much of a political issue best suited
for another forum.
The problem becomes considerably more difficult when one con-
siders, for example, a stoppage by black workers aimed at making the
anniversary of Martin Luther King's death a holiday.87 This dispute,
like the demand for reparations, has its genesis in a situation which is
not directly related to the employer-employee relationship at a par-
ticular establishment. At the same time, however, the desired result-
a new holiday-is, unlike reparations, quite commonly a subject of
collective bargaining. Furthermore, this particular demand, involving
the commemoration of a revered civil rights leader, is, at least sym.
bolically speaking, enmeshed in the protest against discriminatory
hiring practices. This aspect of the example argues for classifying it
with those disputes involving demands to revise seniority systems8 or
to upgrade black workers, both of which are clearly within the rubric
"labor dispute."
Even where racial disputes are clearly related to the employer.
employee relationship, not all walkouts should be protected. One fac-
tor to be considered is the importance of the economic issues involved
to those who have negotiated the collective agreement. In some cases
86. In determining whether a particular subject matter is a condition of employment
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act for duty to bargain purposes,
the Supreme Court attempts to discern whether unions and employers normally deal with
the subject at the bargaining table. See Fibreboard Paper Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 879 U-S.
203, 212 (1964). Cf. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 US. 342 (1958).
87. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1969, at 26, col. 2. Cf. Sligo Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. 1203 (1968);
American Standard, Inc., 52 Lab. Arb. 786 (1969).
88. Cf. Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United States, 71 LRRM
3070 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hayes International Corp., 2 FEP Cases 67 (5th Cir.
1969); U.S. v. Local 38 IBEW, 70 LRRM 3019 (N.D. Ohio 1969); Quarles v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968); Dobbins v. Local 212 IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.
Ohio 1968); U.S. v. H. K. Porter Co., 70 LRRM 2131 (N.D. Ala. 1968). On the issue of
past discrimination and the Court's willingness to tolerate its embodiments in the present
system, see generally Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); Louisiana
v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
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this should preclude the protection of those who would disrupt imple-
mentation of the agreement. In regard to the holiday hypothetical, for
example, it must be said that the negotiation of holidays involves con-
siderations which, because of their cost, are extremely important to
the employer. Holiday benefits, unlike such costs as retraining hard
core unemployed, recur year after year. Before entering into an agree-
ment providing for more of such benefits, the average employer weighs
carefully the cost of the concession and may successfully attempt to
recapture some of these losses by gaining union concessions in other
areas or by making use of technological innovations which save labor
costs.
The governing consideration in determining whether to protect
walkouts over these kinds of disputes is one of contractual obligation
and not whether the stoppage can be properly characterized as a labor
dispute. To give legal protection to economic pressure which upsets
such basic expectations would interfere too severely with the founda-
tions upon which collective bargaining is predicated. Moreover, any
number of groups might persuasively argue that special holiday adjust-
ments should be made in their case also.69 Here the balance must be
resolved in favor of the employer who has bargained in good faith with
the workers' representatives-who presumably have resolved differ-
ences among employees through internal union debate.
The importance of other areas of dispute may vary from industry
to industry. Retraining unemployed blacks, for example, may be a
small expense in an industry where job skills are relatively similar and
uncomplicated. Consequently, such a demand would not greatly en-
danger the contract which had been negotiated between management
and the union. In the steel industry, however, such a program might
require massive expenditures and probably some loss of production;
consequently, where the union and management have made a good
faith effort to integrate black workers into the better paying jobs, a
dispute arising from this demand should be treated similarly to one
arising from the demand for a new holiday. Disputes arising from a
discriminatory hiring system will probably not interfere with the
economic assumptions upon which collective agreements are based.
The overriding theme in all of these cases is the same: a consideration
of the walkout's compatibility with the industrial relations system's
fundamental assumptions as well as a requirement of a conscious, good
89. Cf. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
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faith exploration of the issue in dispute by the parties at the bargain-
ing table.
The expectations of management and labor in regard to the contract
which they have negotiated must be balanced against the discrimina-
tory effect which the contract has on black workers. (The Martin
Luther King holiday issue, for example, does not involve discrimination
as such.) Where the discrimination involved is illegal under Title VII
or another public law, there is no question that a stoppage resulting
from that discrimination should be protected despite the reliance of
union and management. 0 The more difficult problem is posed by the
reference in Tanner to "unconscionable" discrimination of the kind
necessarily alleged in the holiday dispute example as well as the se-
niority system which is not unlawful but adversely affects the job
security of black workers. Such problems are likely to arise from pro.
grams involving the hiring of hard core unemployed since the job
tenure of blacks employed in such programs-without adequate se-
niority credits-is threatened by layoffs. Another possibility is a stop-
page aimed at obtaining the company's consent to an "inverse"
seniority system, such as that which the United Auto Workers recently
supported.0' Such a system would allow whites with greater seniority
to opt for layoffs with supplemental unemployment compensation.
Here, neither law nor arbitration will protect the black worker against
the inherently adverse impact of a "last to be hired, first to be fired"
policy. It seems unfair to ask black workers to compete under such
rules, which apply equally to blacks and whites, where the inability of
blacks to compete has been caused by previous unequal rules.0 2 Thus,
in the absence of a good faith effort by the parties to the bargaining
relationship to mitigate the undesirable affects of the system, the stop.
page should be viewed as protected.
90. See the discussion of Mastro Plastics v. NLRB, pp. 69-70 infra, concerning the pro-
tected nature of the stoppage in defiance of a no-strike clause where the stoppage protests
unlawful conduct.
91. See Auto Workers Proposal for Inverted Seniority, 70 LRRM 0"3 (1969); Dietsch,
Hardcore Blacks and the Shiny Auto, TiE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1969.
92. While such seniority systems may not be unlawful under Title VII, see cages cited
note 88 supra, it is important to keep in mind that prohibitions contained in the .- ecu.
tire Order are apparently broader than those in Title VII. See In re Allen Bradley, OFCC
Docket No. 101-68. Exec. Order 11,246, Decision of the Secretary of Labor (Jan. 17, 1969).
Cf. Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 02
RUTGERs L. REv. 465 (1968).
On the difference between Title VII and the duty of fair representation obligation con-
tained in the National Labor Relations Act as well as the Railway Labor Act, see United
States v. Hayes International Corp., 2 FEP Cases 67, 69 n.6 (5th Cir. 1969); Norman v.
Missouri Pacific Railroad, 71 LRRM 2940, 2947.8 (8th Cir. 1969); Local 12, United Rubber
Workers v. NLR.B, 568 F.2d 12, 24 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 US. 837 (1967).
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An even more formidable problem arises in the case of disputes
protesting disciplinary action taken because of absenteeism and poor
work habits. 93 While such factors as inferior housing, education, and
family environment argue for a dual standard in these cases, it is ex-
tremely difficult to sanction such a walkout where it seems to alter the
uniform application of regulations which have a bona fide economic
justification. One factor which must be considered here is the ability
of the Board to make the distinctions necessary to decide cases of un-
conscionability. It is ill-suited by way of tradition and expertise to
second guess the judgment of the parties in this critical area.' The
solution would be for the Board to stay out of this quagmire of bitter
conflict and resentment, although in some cases the unsympathetic
nature of union and management reactions may require it to act.
In terms of the relationship between black dissidents and exclusive
bargaining agents, the Board's approach to both Draper and Tanner
has it all backwards. In cases involving walkouts which arise from dis-
crimination or unconscionable practices, the Board should not strain
to discover a rapport between the union and the workers, for in
most cases no such rapport exists in fact. Rather, such walkouts should
be presumed to be protected under Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act because they are disruptive of the role played by the
exclusive representative. If the union behaves properly in such cases, it
is the agent through which conflicts should properly emerge. Where
the activities of the unions are so unresponsive as to require blacks
to act on their own, the necessity of ending discrimination requires
that they be protected. If, on the other hand, a union is in accord with
the workers on the racial issue and would support the protest, the
conduct of the black employees should be unprotected. In such cir-
cumstances, there is no justification for bypassing the exclusive rep-
resentative. The question to be answered, of course, is how to deter-
mine the nature of the union's policy.
The past few years have shown that unions hardly have "clean
hands" in matters relating to discrimination. Consequently, the party
which attempts to establish the union's good faith should have to over-
93. "Some unions have been willing to negotiate spedal probationary arrangements to
apply to their companies' hard-core employment programs. But this has been far from
universal." Wallen, Industrial Relations Problems of Employing the Disadvantaged, Paper
delivered at 22nd -Annual Meeting of National Academy of Arbitrators, Jan. 31, 1969.
94. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int. Union, 961 U.S. 477 (1960); NLRB v.
Gamble Enterprises. Inc., 345 U.S. 117 (1953); American Newspaper Publishers A&A'n v.
NLRB, 345 U.S. 100 (1953); NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 313 US. 395
(1952).
The Yale Law Journal
come the presumption that labor has behaved poorly. In addition to
an examination of the union's response to the issue in the particular
case before the Board, evidence of good faith would require a showing
of some kind of affirmative effort on the part of the union at both the
international and local levels to resolve race issues amongst its member-
ship. The establishment of a civil rights department devoted exclu-
sively to the problems of the black worker is not enough. A
prerequisite for such proof should be the integration of leadership
positions inside the union at both the international and local level, or
in its absence, a bona fide effort by the leadership to achieve this result.
This aspect of good faith is particularly significant where blacks con-
stitute a large percentage of the union's membership. The leadership's
activities are crucial since, despite protestations about the democratic
nature of unions," it is normally the "slate" sponsored by the leader-
ship, on either a formal or informal basis, which is all-important in
the electoral process.
To render the black protest unprotected where the evidence reflects
an effort at racial justice seems more sensible than the analysis adopted
by the Board which rewards the strikers when the union is purported
to have acted properly. Unlike the Board's views as expressed in
Tanner, it does not presume good faith by the unions, and does give
the Board a means of judging those cases which involve unconscionable
as opposed to illegal conduct. Such cases, posed as discharge and dis-
cipline issues, often arise from black workers' refusal to tolerate what
they regard as poor or unsafe working conditions. 0 Rather than judge
the nature of the conditions, the Board can judge the motives of the
union and allow the unions to decide the substantive issues. Again,
the union's failure to show that it had exerted all reasonable efforts
to integrate leadership positions would be fatal to any effort to under-
mine the employee's protected status.
As stated above, the Congressional scheme for maintaining peace
between labor and management has revolved around the idea of a
quid pro quo relationship between the right to arbitration and the
no-strike pledge. Changes should be made in arbitration to make this
95. See generally iLPsEr, TpRow & COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY (1956).
96. The no-strike clause does not govern where workers walk out in protest against
unsafe working conditions. See, e.g., Fruin-Colmon Construction Co., 189 NLRB 894 (1962)2
Knight Morley Corp., 116 NLRB 140 (1956), enforced, 251 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1957). Al
objective test is used to determine if the employment conditions are "abnormally danger.
ous." Redwing Carriers, Inc., 180 NLRB 1208 (1961). If the work is "highly unpleasant"
rather than "abnormally dangerous" the walkout is unprotected. Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co.,
145 NLRB 473 (1963).
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tool more applicable to racial disputes: the minimum to be imposed
on the union and management in the handling of such grievances is
a right of third party intervention for the racial minority group. z
Such third party procedures, or trilateral arbitration where a civil
rights agreement is involved,98 would provide a type of "standing"
which would be of special value in those cases involving what black
workers believe are inferior working conditions.
The justification for these changes may be found in the Supreme
Court's clarion call for "judicial inventiveness," in Textile Vorhers
Union v. Lincoln Mills.9 The decision held that judicially created
arbitral remedies might be devised in the light of guidelines from
federal labor law. Third party representation is certainly not too much
of a burden for unions and managements to bear under the agreement.
On the contrary, unless there is a contract or agreement negotiated by
a civil rights organization or an agency such as the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, which the arbitrator is given the authority
to construe, intervention does not provide much more than a minimal
due process protection.
Enforcement of a no-strike pledge should be dependent on the
parties' acceptance of the procedures described above. Where no
changes are made in the essential concept of two-party arbitration, the
no-strike clause should not be allowed to hinder attempts to alter
unconscionable practices. Where, however, unlawful discrimination
has been practiced by unions or employers, adoption of the procedures
in toto ought not to exculpate the parties from the obligation to re-
instate with back pay in the event of a walkout. Mastro Plastics, where
the employers' unfair labor practices in effect exonerated the violation
of a broad no-strike ban, provides the analogue for such a policy.100
While the Board has limited the Mastro Plastics doctrine to "major"
unfair labor practices, public policy considerations argue against a
similar limitation of the rule in regard to racial disputes. If-as it was
in Mastro Plastics-the goal of industrial peace can be so substantially
97. See Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118
U. PA. L. R-v. 40 (1969).
98. But see Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 US. 261 (1964).
99. The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law.
It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems
will lie in the penumbra of expressed statutory mandates. Some will lack express statu-
tory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation and fashion-
ing a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will
be determined by the nature of the problem.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln M fills, 353 US. 448, 457 (1957).
100. Mastro Plastics v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). See pp. 55.56 supra.
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qualified when the union's existence is at stake, surely the federal
policy against discrimination should protect this kind of walkout. The
latter policy is even more fundamental to our country than the protec-
tion of collective bargaining.
If the Board can determine that actions by a union violate the law,
the no-strike pledge should clearly be of no consequence. Such a con-
clusion need not await the decision of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission or the courts, for the Board is experienced in
making determinations in this area.101 Where no changes are made in
the arbitration procedure, the same policy should hold, but where the
parties accept third party intervention, the strikers' case should become
considerably more difficult. Far more should be required than the
Tanner standard that they have a "reasonable basis for believing that
discrimination exists." In short, the requirement of the Mastro Plastics
rationale where arbitration procedure has been revised is that the
practices must offend the law itself.'0 2 In light of the havoc caused by
labor stoppages, this does not seem to be an unreasonable requirement.
These procedures and policies also provide a means of protection for
the non-discriminatory employer who is faced with an unfair union.
In such cases, the employer can claim with some justice that it is unfair
to hinge the protected status of a dispute on the good faith of the
union and particularly its failure to establish an integrated leadership.
Management, which suffers substantial harm from such stoppages, can-
not use its influence to effectively prevent such walkouts. This, of
course, is precisely the position in which the employer now finds him-
self when the Board, as it often does, plunges into internal union
machinations in a futile quest to discover whether or not the striking
workers are acting in derogation of their exclusive bargaining agent.103
When faced with a recalcitrant union and conditions which could lead
101. United Packinghouse v. NLRB, 70 LRRM 2489 (D.C. Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Local
1367, I.L.A., 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 US. 837 (1967); Local 12,
United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S, 837
(1967).
102. Professor Cox has taken the position that Mastro Plastics should have been ra-
tionalized as involving a material breach of contract thereby immunizing employee conduct
which was in violation of the no-strike clause. See Cox, The Legal Natture of Collective
Bargaining Agreements, 57 MxcH. L. REV. 1, 18 (1958). Contra, Summers, Collective Agree-
ments and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 525, 544-47 (1969). See generally United
Packinghouse Workers Local 721 v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 2,17 (1964); Drake
Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); Local 748, Inter-
national Union of Electrical Workers v. Jefferson City Cabinet Co., 314 F.2d 192 (6th Cir.
1963). But see Danner Press, Inc., 153 NLRB 1092 (1965), enforcement denied, 374 F.2d 230
(6th Cir. 1967); San Juan Lumber Co., 154 NLRB 1153 (1965). Cf. Ford Motor Co., 131
NLRB 1462 (1961).
103. For an example of the difficulties see Office of the General Counsel, NLRB,
Quarterly Report on Case Developments, November 1, 1966, at 12.
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to a protected stoppage, the employer can-after bargaining-unilater-
ally institute appropriate changes.104 Where there is a reasonable
basis for believing that working conditions meet the Tanner discrim-
ination standard, the union should be held to have bargained in bad
faith under the Act. 05 The Board should then use its authority to
proceed into federal court and obtain an injunction against a strike
by the union.106 Any other result would penalize the employer who
attempts to eliminate discriminatory conditions.
Finally, it is interesting to note that many of the racial wildcat strikes
to date have arisen out of tensions between black workers and white
foremen and demands that more black foremen be hired.10 7 While a
walkout protesting management's selection of foremen is a protected
activity under certain circumstances, 08 the employer is not required to
104. NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (19.19). Here, however, since
a finding would be made that the working conditions which the employer sought to elimi-
nate are unconscionable or unlawful, presumably, there would be no duty to bargain to the
point of impasse as is the case with mandatory subjects of bargaining. See NLRB v.
Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
105. See generally Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,
62 COLUm. L. Ra,. 563, 589-590 (1962).
106. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1964). The employer could presumably discharge workers en-
gaged in such a strike inasmuch as it would be aimed at preventing the elimination of
unconsdonable or unlawful discrimination against Negro workers the activity would be
unprotected. See Hesmer Foods, Inc., 161 NLRB 485, 491 n.3 (1966); Administrative Ruling
of the General Counsel No. 56, 27 LRRM 1442 (1951). The injunction would be applicable
to a strike which attempts to obtain an objective in violation of Executive Order or Title
VII. See United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers and Papenvorkers, 282 F. Supp. 9
(E.D. La. 1968); Central Contractors Association v. Local 46, IBEW, 2 FEP Cases 189 (W.D.
Wash. 1969). On the labor injunction, see generally FnxmuNaxuxTm & Gnanr., Tun I~noa
INJUNMCION (1930); Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 UCLA L. RM,. 292 (1963);
Lesnick, State-Court Injunctions and the Federal Common Law of Labor Contracts: Be-
yond Norris-LaGuardia, 79 HARv. L. RFv. 757 (1966).
107. See note 5 supra.
108. The cases do not appear to show any instance of wildcat activity. Concerted ac-
tivity short of work stoppage is protected; Colson Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 128 (Sth Cir.
1965) (walkout protest mas held protected, but the position of "lead man," the eye of the
dispute, was found to be a non-supervisory position); NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum
Electric Co-op, Inc., 285 F.2d 8 (6th Cir. 1960) (presenting a grievance over appointment
of operations manager's son-in-law as foreman, causing increased work burdens due to the
man's inexperience); NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 19-18),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 845 (1948) (protesting a letter recommending promotion of asistant
cashier to cashier, whose function had a material effect on tie earnings of the salesmen,
was also held protected). Similarly, a walkout in protest of assigning an underexperienced
helper is also protected concerted activity. Hagopian & Sons, 395 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1968).
On the different but related issue of the status of strikers protesting the discharge of a
person already in the position of foreman, the authorities are divided. Holding such ac-
tivity protected are: NLRB v. Puerto Rico Rayon Mills, Inc., 293 F.2d 941 (lst Cir. 1961);
Summit Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Solo Cup Co., 237
F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1956). Holding or stating that such activity is not protected are: Amer-
ican Clay Co. v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 88 (7th Cir. 1964); Dobbs Houses, Inc. v. NLRB, 925 F.2d
531 (5th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Ford Radio and Mica Corp., 258 F.2d 457 C2d Cir. 1958);
NLRB v. Coal Creek Coal Co., 204 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1947). It is interesting to note in
passing that the 7th Circuit in writing what became the leading authority, cited no au-
thority or statutory provision to support their assertion-whether or not any were available
to them. A comment to the effect that selection of foremen is exclusively the prerogative of
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bargain with the union on this issue; appointments may be made
unilaterally. Accordingly, employers are relatively unlikely to be pre-
sented here with the quandary which exists in other types of racial
issues.
II. The Lawfulness of Picketing
A. Picketing as an Unfair Labor Practice
In 1947 and 1959 Congress amended the National Labor Relations
Act to immunize employers dealing with an exclusive bargaining
representative from economic pressure by another "labor organization"
to deal with it. Specifically, Congress stated in Section 8(b)(4)(C) that
it was an unfair labor practice to exert such pressure where "an object"
is "forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a
particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if
another labor organization has been certified as the representative of
such employees under the provisions of Section 9 .... -10 In response
to the same problem in cases where the employer dealt with a lawfully
recognized union which had not been certified under the Act, Congress,
in 1959, enacted Section 8(b)(7)(A). The section provides that it is un-
lawful to picket or threaten to picket where "an object" of the action
is recognition or commencement of bargaining with a "labor organiza-
tion," or the acceptance of the labor organization as the collective
bargaining representative where "the employer has lawfully recognized
in accordance with this Act any other labor organization and a question
concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under
Section 9(c) of this Act." 0
One can readily appreciate that the above-quoted provisions are at
odds with some disruptive tactics employed by parties outside the
employer-exclusive representative relationship. Thus under some cir-
cumstances, the picketing which is part and parcel of the walkout over
discrimination issues may be an unfair labor practice under the Act.'
Preliminarily, however, two significant prerequisites are required to
trigger either Section 8(b)(4)(C) or 8(b)(7)(A): (I) the existence of a
management, made by the union president, is referred to in the opinion. NLRB V. Reynold%
International Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680, 654 (7th ir. 1947),
109. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1964).
110. 29 US.C. 1 158(b)(7)A) (1964).
111. The Supreme Court has equated the right to picket with the right to strike, at least
in some contexts. NLRB v. Teamsters Local 639, 562 U.S. 274 (1960).
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"labor organization" which is attempting to disrupt the relationship;
and (2) the unlawful objective of recognition or bargaining.
To what extent is the term "labor organization" as used in the
Act1: ' applicable to committees of black workers and civil rights
organizations which intervene on behalf of minority group employees
and their allies? To date, the term "labor organization" has been given
an expansive interpretation. In NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.,'' 3 the
Court held that Congress intended the term to include those groups
which merely "deal" with the employer as well as the more traditional
union structure which bargains collectively as a majority representa-
tive.'' 4 This, however, does not meet the question of whether a "group
of employees" allowed to present grievances to the employer for ad-
justment under the proviso clause of Section 9(a) could "deal" with an
employer in regard to some issues despite the exclusive representative.
And, of course, the question remains whether a "group of employees"
specifically constituted to deal with problems of racial discrimination
might possess a different legal status than other groups. It does seem
quite clear that the thrust of Cabot Carbon argues for the inclusion of
a good number of black workers' organizations and groups like the
NAACP and the Urban League, when they become involved in
disputes over employment conditions.
Even if a labor organization is involved in the economic pressure
and picketing, evidence of an unlawful "object" must still be presented
to enjoin the action under the amendments. Prior to the adoption of
the 1959 amendments, the Board held the view that picketing by an
outside labor organization was equated with picketing for an unlawful
object, i.e., recognition or bargaining.11 5 This approach was attacked
by Professor Cox,"0 and, in Ford Fanelli Sales,1'7 the Board specifically
overruled its prior holding that a "strike or picketing by a union to
obtain reinstatement of a discharged employee 'necessarily' is to compel
recognition or bargaining on such matters .... "1 Adopting a fact-
oriented test, the Board stated:
112. "The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency
or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 29
U.S.C. § 152(5) (1964).
113. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
114. Id. at 211-12.
115. Meat & Provision Drivers Union, 115 NLRB 890 (1956).
116. Cox, The Landrum-Griffln Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act,
44 ftn,. L. REV. 257, 266-270 (1959).
117. 133 NLRB 1463 (1961).
118. Id.
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It may not be gainsaid, of course, that picketing for an employee's
reinstatement may in some circumstances be used as a pretext
for attaining recognition as collective-bargaining representative
of all the employees in a certain unit. But before we are willing
to infer such broader objective, some more affirmative showing
of such object must be made than exists here.11
The Ford Fanelli doctrine brings into play the same considerations
which prompted the Fourth Circuit to declare wildcat strikes unpro-
tected in Draper. To sanction this use of economic pressure is to permit
some kind of contact and, perhaps, negotiation between the pickets and
the employer-at least when both are ready for accomodation. In the
much publicized arbitration award in Hotel Employers Association,12 0
the arbitrator concluded that negotiations and an agreement between
a civil rights organization and an unionized employer were unlawful
under Section 9. 1 The civil rights agreement was inconsistent with
the labor contract and entered into outside the exclusive bargaining
representative's presence; thus, the award would appear to be correct
on that score.
It is by no means clear, however, that it would be unlawful for an
employer to deal with a civil rights organization or a black workers'
committee so long as the union was involved in any negotiations and
settlement entered into by management. In the Tanner122 context of
hiring disputes and industrial unions, the bargaining agent's presence
might not be necessary so long as nothing agreed upon was inconsistent
with the collective agreement itself. Certainly, in vacuo, the civil rights
group is a less disruptive element in the exclusive bargaining frame-
work than a rival union which, by definition, seeks to oust the in-
cumbent union.123 The same is not necessarily true of an organization
concerned with the special problems of black workers.
One circuit court has also applied a strict test in determining
what constitutes bargaining. In National Packing Co., Inc.,"24 the
119. Id. at 1468-69. See also Bldg. & Const. Trades Council v. NLRB, 396 F.2d 677, 683
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Restaurant Management, Inc., 147 NLRB 1060 (1961); Eastern Camera &
Photo Corp., 141 NLRB 991, 997 (1963); Mission Valley Inn, 140 NLRB 433 (1963); Wood-
ward Motors, Inc., 135 NLRB 851 (1962). Cf. Weiss, The Unlawful Object in 8(bX7) Picket-
ing, 13 LAB. L.J. 787 (1962).
120. 47 Lab. Arb. 873 (1966).
121. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964). See note 26 supra.
122. Discussed pp. 57-64 supra.
123. Cf. Douds v. Local 1250, Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, 170 F.2d
695 (2d Cir. 1948). See generally Bronian v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 953 F.2d 559
(6th Cir. 1965); Black-Clawson Co. v. Lodge 855, IAM, 313 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1962); Fed.
Tel. & Radio Co., 107 NLRB 649 (1953); Dunau, Employee Participation in the Grievance
Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUt. L. Ryv. 731, 751-760 (1950).
124. 147 NLRB 446 (1964), enforcement denied, 352 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1965), original
order aff'd., 158 NLRB 1680 (1966), enforcement denied, and order set aside, 377 F.2d 800
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NLRB had to decide whether employees whose strike over dangerous
working conditions, subsequent to a union's defeat in Board-conducted
elections, had been enjoined were entitled to reinstatement and back
pay. The Board initially held for the dismissed workers because the
employer had engaged in unfair labor practices.5 The Tenth Circuit
remanded the case to the Board, questioning whether the picketing
by the workers violated Section 8(b)(7)(B). 0 If, the opinion reasons,
the employees had in fact violated the above noted provision through
unlawful picketing, "they should not be able to use the Act to compel
reinstatement after the discharge which followed the picketing." - -
Despite the fact that the strikers had indicated a desire for "some-
thing in writing," the Board found on remand that the picketing had
not been for an unlawful object, i.e. the establishment of a "bargain-
ing" relationship:
We do not view this as an attempt to establish a continuing re-
lationship, but only as an attempt to bind the Respondent to its
promises. To accomplish this might have required discussions to
the extent necessary to resolve the issues in dispute. This is not to
be equated, however, with an attempt to negotiate an overall
formal collective-bargaining agreement covering wages, hours,
and working conditions.
: * We have held that Section 8(b)(7)(B) does not preclude picket-
ing to protest an employer's unfair labor practices. We find that
Section 8(b)(7)(B) does not preclude employees from protestin
by a peaceful walkout and picketing, their employer's broken
promises. To read Section 8(b)(7)(B) as precluding such action
would place employees under due pressure to vote for a union in
an election or lose the right for a year thereafter to engage in a
concerted protest against any action taken by their employer, how-
ever unfair or disadvantageous to the employees.128
When the case returned to the Tenth Circuit, the court decided that a
finding of an unlawful object as far as bargaining is concerned could
not be avoided by the Board's holding that there was no attempt to
establish a continuing relationship. "The statute refers to bargaining
-not to bargaining for any period of time."'-'
This holding, however, is simply wrong. There is a fundamental
(19th Cir. 1967). See generally Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a
Misnomer-'Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. RE%'. 378, 596403 (199); Comment,
Employee Picketing and Section S(bX7XB), 47 Trx. L. Rrv. 294 (1969).
12. 147 NLRB 446 (1964).
126. 352 F.2d 485.
127. Id.
128. 158 NLRB at 1686.
129. 577 F.2d at 804.
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difference between a full-fledged collective bargaining relationship and
the adjustment of particular grievances, even when the adjustment is
formalized in writing as a "contract." Section 9(a) itself recognizes this
difference by permitting a degree of individual or group adjustment
of grievances in the teeth of the exclusive representative concept.
The Board's recent decision in Moss-American, Incuo is the first
application of the 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) provisions to a racial dispute.
There, the company rejected a request by the NAACP-acting as a
representative of the members of the Local-to cease forwarding dues
and assessments to the international union (the exclusive bargaining
representative) under the checkoff provision until written permission
has been obtained from each member of the Local. The production
and maintenance employees then struck, shutting down the plant. The
leaders of the employees' group, which included the officers of the
Local, stated that they did not consider the contract signed by the
international union to be binding and in effect. The Trial Examiner
stated that since the employees in the plant were "predominantly
Negro, it seems natural and fitting that the Local's officers sought the
counsel and assistance of the local head of the NAACP."131 The Board
agreed with the Trial Examiner that the Local was not operating as a
distinct entity but could constitute a "labor organization" within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Since the Local was "not seeking
to be recognized or bargained with apart from the certified representa-
tive," the Board did not consider their conduct to violate Sections
8(b)(4)(C) or 8(b)(7)(A).1 2
One of the demands made by the Local, however, was "for a con-
tract." This, coupled with the NAACP's letter concerning dues
authorizations, brings the case perilously close to the kind of activity
which is prohibited by the statute. The statute does not tolerate
economic pressure which attempts to circumvent the NLRA election
procedures pursuant to which the majority representatives are chosen.
Moss-American aside, it is clearly inconsistent with Ford Fanelli to say
that, in the absence of a finding that the exclusive representative has
engaged in unlawful racial discrimination,133 the local black workers'
180. 178 NLRB No. 80, 72 LRRM 1078 (1969). The trial examiner's decision appears
in Cases 14-CP-110 and 14-CE-500 (TXD-780-68, Dec. 31, 1968).
131. Trial Examiner's Decision at 8.
132. 72 LRRM at 1080.
138. Presumably, § 8(b)(4) and (7) cannot be used as a shield by parties that discriminate,
any more than § 9. Hughes Tool Co., 147 NLRB 1573 (1964); Pioneer Bus Co., 140 NLRB
54 (1962). Cf. Hughes Tool Co., 104 NLRB 318 (1953). In the absence of racial dicrlmlna.
tion, collective bargaining relationship is preserved by the Board through § 9. Sec Leonard
Wholesale Meats, Inc., 186 NLRB 1000 (1962).
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committee or organization which seeks to oust the international or
local union will not violate Sections 8(b)(4)(C) and 8(b)(7)(A).
The Trial Examiner in Moss-Atmerican commented in his decision:
"The record shows that the great majority of the Company's produc-
tion and maintenance employees are black; the regional director of
the International and his assistants are white men."1 4 All too often
the heart of current tensions between unions and the black rank-and-
file may be found in the insensitivity of white leadership to poor or
unsafe working conditions which affect black workers. The solution
to this problem demands, as a first step, the development of black
leadership at the local and international levels. This requirement sug-
gests that the proper policy for the Board is to apply Sections 8(b)(4)(C)
and 8(b)(7)(A) only in instances where there is an outright conflict
concerning the continuing exclusive status of the majority representa-
tive. Economic pressure may be one of the few viable means by which
the unions can be impelled to share elected leadership positions with
Negro workers and to involve themselves in the problems of the newly
hired "disadvantaged" worker. Although I am somewhat skeptical
about the long range usefulness of the "black union" trend,135 one must
recognize that if the walkouts and pickets do not succeed in their
legitimate objectives, black workers may well seek another representa-
tive not patt of the traditional union structure or reject trade unionism
altogether.
B. Constitutional Problems in Race-Related Picketing
Quite apart from the question of the legal status of picketing by
black workers under the national labor laws, state or federal courts
may be persuaded to issue injunctions against such picketing on other
grounds. Little imagination is needed to realize that such proceedings
will raise constitutional problems, although the resolution of the first
amendment issues presented by the situations likely to arise are by no
means clear.
In Hughes v. Superior Court,3a the Supreme Court affirmed the
California Supreme Court's finding that peaceful picketing for the
purpose of inducing an employer to hire a number of Negro workers
134. Trial DExaminer's decision, supra note 130, at 8 n.11.
135. See Gould, Discrimination and the Unions, Dwssr, Sept.-Oct. 1967, at 564, re-
printed in PovrR': ViEWs rRot TE Lr.r 160-83 (Lamer & Howe ed. 1903). Cf. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 2, 1969, at 60.
186. 339 U.S. 460 (1950). For discussions of this case, see Rosen, The Law and Racial
Discrimination in Employment, 53 CAr.. L. RE v. 729, 763-68 (1955); , einer, Negro Picheting
for Employment Equality, 13 HOWARD L.J. 271, 284-301 (1967).
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in proportion to Negro patronage was unlawful and could be enjoined.
The majority of the California Supreme Court had upheld a contempt
citation on the theory that the picketing had as its unlawful objective
the creation of a "closed Negro shop" which was a "specific unlawful
purpose" regardless of whether the employer was in fact engaging in
racial discrimination.'"3 Judge Traynor's dissent, however, remains a
very persuasive argument for the legality of economic pressure by racial
groups to achieve equality in employment opportunities:
Those racial groups against whom discrimination is practiced may
seek economic equality either by demanding that hiring be done
without reference to race or color, or by demanding a certain
number of jobs for members of their group. The majority opinion
holds that economic equality cannot be sought by the second
method if picketing is adopted as the means of attaining that ob-
jective. In the absence of a statute protecting them from dis-
crimination it is not unreasonable for Negroes to seek economic
equality by asking those in sympathy with their aims to help them
secure jobs that may be opened to them by the enlistment of such
aid. In their struggle for equality the only effective economic
weapon Negroes have is the purchasing power they are able to
mobilize to induce employers to open jobs to them.... There are
so few neighborhoods where Negroes can make effective appeals
against discrimination that they may reasonably regard the seek-
ing of jobs in neighborhoods where their appeal may be effective
the only practical means of combating discrimination against
them. In arbitrating the conflicting interests of different groups in
society courts should not impose ideal standards on one side when
they are powerless to impose similar standards upon the other.
Only a clear danger to the community would justify judicial rules
that restrict the peaceful mobilization of a group's economic power
to secure economic equality .... There is no reality in the reason-
ing that those who seek to secure jobs where they have an op-
portunity to enlist public support on their behalf are thereby
seeking illegal discrimination in their favor, for the fact remains
that everywhere they turn for jobs they are likely to encounter
the barrier of discrimination.13
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for a unanimous Court,139 stated that
California's affirmative response to the problems of racial discrimina-
tion 40 was "relevant" to the California Supreme Court's judgment
that quotas were inconsistent with that state's public policy, and that
137. Hughes v. Superior Court 32 Cal. 2d 850, 856, 198 P.2d 85 (1948).
138. 32 Cal. 2d at 868.
139. Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate in the decision. 339 US. at 469.
140. 339 Us. at 463.
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picketing might exacerbate community tensions and conflicts. He also
reiterated that picketing is a "mode of communication," something
"more and different" than free speech itself:
Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may
convey the same information or make the same charge as do those
patrolling a picket line. But the very purpose of a picket line is to
exert influences, and it produces consequences different from other
modes of communication. Loyalties and responses evoked and
exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by
printed words.' 41
The unlawful purpose test, as used by the Court in picketing cases,
is not unique to Hughes. The Court had proclaimed picketing to be
a form of first amendment speech in Thornhill v. Alabama. 42 The
doctrine was soon qualified, however, in Giboney v. Empire Storage
6 Ice, 43 which held that picketing with a purpose to violate state anti-
trust law could be constitutionally enjoined. Under the steady rein of
Justice Frankfurter, the Court began to defer to the state's judgment
concerning the conflict between picketing and public policy, usually
resolving the matter in favor of the latter. 44 This trend eventually
prompted Mr. Justice Douglas to remark in one dissent that the retreat
from the principles articulated in Thornhill had blossomed into a
"formal surrender."'
45
However, the first amendment protection afforded picketing seems
to have revived a bit in recent years.'40 In Amalgamated Food Em-
ployees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,147 for example, the Court-
still adhering to the unlawful purpose test-held that peaceful picketing
on private property "open generally to the public is, absent other factors
involving the purpose or manner of the picketing, protected by the
First Amendment."' 48
141. Id. at 465.
142. 310 US. 88 (1940).
143. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
144. See Plumbers Union, Local 10 v. Graham, 345 US. 192 (1953); Teamsters Union
v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Building Service Employees International Union v. Gazzam,
339 US. 532 (1940). See generally Cox, Strikes, Pideting and the Constitution, 4 VAND.
L. REV. 574 (1951).
145. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 US. 284, 297 (1957).
146. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 377
U.S. 58 (1964); NLRB v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960); Teamsters Local 795
v. Newell, 356 US. 341 (1958). This constitutional revival of the first amendment could
have implications for Section 7 of the NLRA. See Solo Cup Co., 172 NLRB No. 110, 63
LR.RM 1385 (1968), and the Board's reliance upon Amalgamated Food Employees Union
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 US. 308 (1968), discussed infra. Compare notes 160 and
162 infra.
147. 391 US. 308 (1968).
148. Id. at 313. See generally Gould, Union Organizational Rights and the Concept of
Quasi-Public Property, 49 MINN. L. Ray. 505 (1965).
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Even assuming that state court jurisdiction over cases like Hughes
is not preempted because it is arguably protected or prohibited activity
under the National Labor Relations Act,1 40 Hughes' rationale is open
to considerable attack. One argument rests upon the emphasis in
Giboney that the union's "sole" and "immediate" object was an unlaw-
ful one.15 0 Assuming for the moment that the aims of the picketing
can be characterized as unlawful, one wonders whether picketing
against what is believed to be a discriminatory employment policy, and
demanding a "proportional hiring" remedy, can be said to be con-
cerned with the remedy alone.'
15 Certainly, the protest has a broader
focus than the quota issue.
149. In addition to the problems of protected activity under Tanner, even stranger
picketing of the Hughes type might raise Section 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) problems 
under the
Act. Therefore, absent violence or a threat to order, it would appear as 
though a substan-
tial portion of racial discrimination walkout and picketing cases are preempted 
under the
Act. See San Diego Building Council v. Garmon, 359 US. 236 (1959) (subject matter arguably
protected or prohibited under the Act is preempted for the primary jurisdiction 
of tim
National Labor Relations Board). Cf. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 87 U.S.L.W. 4247 (U.S. Mar. 25 1969); Marine Engineers Beneficial 
Ass'n
v. Interlake S.s. Co., 370 U.S. 173 (1962). However, there are certain areas in 
which the
states have been permitted to exercise jurisdiction despite Garmon See Linn 
v. United
Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 US. 53 (1966); Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2,
Marine Engineers, 382 U.S. 181 (1965). But in the area of duty of fair representation 
the
normal rules of preemption do not apply. Vaca v. Sipes, 060 US. 171 (11967). Therefore,
racial discrimination is within the reach of state courts.
Inasmuch as the Board has assumed jurisdiction in Tanner over walkouts protesting
"unlawful" discrimination, it is even arguable that the state courts are thereby deprived 
of
enjoining picketing with an object which they i.e. the state courts, regard as 
unlawful,
as was the case in Hughes. If state jurisdiction is preempted, it would appear that 
state
court injunctions could be properly defied if there is an attempt to challenge tho Injunc-
tion's validity; In re Green 369 U.S. 689 (1962). Cf. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 588
US. 307, 316 n.6 (1967). The National Labor Relations Board can enjoin state court action
when it touches areas within the Board's unfair labor pratice jurisdiction. Capital Serv.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954) Cf. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bro,,
348 U.S. 511 (1955); Cameron v. Johnson, 36 U.S.L.W. 4319 (1968). If an injunction against
a civil rights organization, black workers' committee, or individual strikers is granted upon
a violation of the labor contract, i.e., the no-strike clause, the suit could be removed to
federal court on the ground that the court would have "original jurisdiction" of the subject
matter. Avco Corp. v. Machinists, Aero Lodge 735, 36 US.L.W. 4288 (1968). The result
would probably be the same even if the civil rights group could not properly ba regarded
as a labor organization. See Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 200 (1012), ,Cf,
Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 249 n.7 (1962). However, it is not yet clear
whether the federal court is required or merely empowered to dissolve the previously
issued state court injunction. See Lesnick, supra. An attempt to remove on the theory
that First Amendment and Title VII rights would not be vindicated otherwise would
probably be unsuccessful. City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966). The fair
employment practices provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 do not appear to be as
specific on this score as the public accommodations provisions were found to be In State
of Georgia v. Rachel, 984 U.S. 780 (1966).
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Commn v. Continental Airlines Inc., 372 US. 714 (1963),
and, indeed, the statutory scheme of Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1961, encourage the
state to exercise jurisdiction. But, in light of the above-noted considerations, it Is doubtful
that most picketing against racial discrimination in employment is properly within state
court jurisdiction.
150. 336 U.S. 490, 492 (1949).
151. See Rosen, supra, note 136.
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If this point needs emphasis it is to be found in New Negro Al-
liance,15 2 where the Court in a similar fact situation made it clear that
picketing against racial discrimination in employment is entitled to
even more protective scope than is labor union picketing. Of course,
that decision was handed down two years before the Court's clear
statement in Thornhill that picketing enjoys first amendment protec-
tion. But, despite the willingness of state courts to enjoin similar kinds
of picketing,'53 the fact of the matter is that supreme federal law'54 as
reflected in Title VII and the National Labor Relations Act is not
clearly hostile to the quota-let alone the fixing of numbers of minority
group workers to be employed in the trade. Even assuming that Title
VII forbids the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from
remedying unlawful employment practices through such means, the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance is not similarly restrained.1 15
152. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Drouwry Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).
153. See NAACP v. Webb's City, Inc., 152 So.2d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. A pp. 1963), vacated
mem. 376 U.S. 190 (1964); NAACP v. Overstreet, 221 Ga. 16, 142 S.E2d 816 (1965), cart.
dismissed as improvidently granted 584 US. 118 (1966) (Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting
with Chief Justice Warren, Justice Brennan and Justic Fortas); Young Adults for Progres-
sive Action, Inc. v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc., 151 So. 2d 877 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
163); Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. litnick, 245 Ind. 324, 198 N.E.2d 765 (1964) cert.
denied 879 US. 843 (1964); Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Philip Nagdeman & Sons,
193 N.E.2d 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 1963) cert. denied 379 U.S. 818 (1964, City of Sumpter v.
Lewis, 241 S.C. 364, 128 S.E2d 684 (1962), A.S. Beck Shoe Corp. v. Johnson, 153 Mic.
363 (S. Ct. 1934); Green v. Samuelson, 168 Md. 421, 178 At. 109 (1935); LiMhitz v. Straughn,
261 App. Div. 757 (1941); Brandenburg v. Metropolitan Package Store Ass'n, 29 Misc 2d
817, 211 N.Y..2d 621 (S. Ct. 1961). Cf. Curtis v. Tozer, 874 S.WA2d 557 (Mo. App. 1964;
federal habeas corpus dismissed in Ford v. Boeger, 249 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Mo. 1965,
affirmed, 862 F.2d 999 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied 586 U.S. 914 (1967), reh. denied 37
U.S. 949 (1967); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Washington Chapter of CORE, 209 F. Supp.
559 (D.D.C. 1962); Clemmons v. Congress of Racial Equality, 201 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ia.
1962).
154. See Legislative History of Titles VII and XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3344-45
Gould, The Negro Revolution and the Law of Collective Bargaining, 34 FoRmDtIM L. RLv.
207 (1965). Pub. L. 88-352, Title, VII, § 703, July 2, 1964, 78 stat. 255, 42 U.S.C. § 2000C-2.
Cf. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1969, p. 24, col. 1.
155. Legal Memorandum of Solicitor of Labor to Comptroller General on Legal
Authority under E.O. 11246 for "Revised Philadelphia Plan," Daily Labor Report,
No. 136 E-1, July 16, 1969. See also Opinion of Attorney General John Mitchell on
Legality of Revised Philadelphia Plan, Sept. 22, 1969, reported in Daily Labor Report,
Sept. 23, 1969, No. 184, E-l. approving the Plan's lawfulness.
The quota controversy has been triggered anew by the Nixon Administration's ac-
ceptance of the Revised Philadelphia Plan. The Philadelphia Plan, which Secretary of
Labor Schultz, described on July 3, 1969, as a "fair and realistic approach" to providing
greater equal employment opportunity for minority group workers in federally asisted
construction, provides that contractors must employ a certain number of minority group
workers-the number of workers to be ascertained in light of the follouing principal
factors: (1) the current extent of minority group participation in the tra e; (2) the
availability of minority group persons for employment in such trade; (3) the need for
training programs in the area and/or the need to assure demand for those in or from
existing training programs; (4) the impact of the program upon the existing labor force.
The Plan has been declared legal by both Attorney General John Mitchell and the
Solicitor of Labor. See Naughton, U.S. to Start Plan Giving Minorities Jobs in Building,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1969, p. 18, col. 5; Legal Memorandum of Solicitor of Labor to
Comptroller General on Legal Authority Under E.O. 11246 for "Revied Philadelphia
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Another basic flaw in Hughes is Justice Frankfurter's failure to
distinguish between labor and civil rights picketing in terms of their
respective impacts upon the intended audience. As Professor Cox has
said:
Unions exercise . . . power not by appealing to the public but
because of the discipline of their members. The critical point,
however, is not the success of such tactics but the fact that the
union members respect the picket line because of a group disci-
pline based partly on common loyalties, partly on the force of
habit, partly on fear of social ostracism but also on severe eco-
nomic sanctions. The truck driver who crosses a teamsters' is sub-
ject not only to union fines but also to expulsion, and in the
trucking industry suspension or expulsion from the union may
carry with it loss of employment.150
This kind of background appears to be responsible for much of the
Plan," July 16, 1969, Daily Labor Report E-1 (No. 136), July 16, 1969; Herbers, Nixon
Aides Explain the Goal of Job Plan, The New York Times, Oct. 29, 1969, p. 27, col, 1.
The Nixon Administration has stated that the Plan will be extended to other urban areas,
See Naughton, U.S. Will Extend Minority Job Aid, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1969, p. 1. col. 2.
The building trades have not taken kindly to these developments. See Stetson, Meany is
Doubtful on US. Plan to Set Minority Hiring Quotas, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1969, p. 11,
col. 5; Stetson, Building Unions Spur Negro Jobs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1969, p. 1, col, 6;
Stetson, Meany Criticizes Nixon on Racism, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1969, p. 25, col. 1;
Wicker, Adventures in the Building Trade, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1969, p. 44, col. 3.
Even if Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could be read to say that the Phila-
delphia Plan's proposed "quotas" are unlawful under that statute, it seems clear that
Congress specifically contemplated the existence of an independent federal agency which
would prescribe its own rules and regulations relating to fair employment practices, See
Section 709(d). The obligations that employers have under the Executive Order are
broader than those which pertain to Title VII. See Note 88. But even assuming that Title
VII applies to the Executive Order insofar as this problem is concerned, or that it has some
relevance because of a need for uniformity in federal labor law and civil rights law, It
would seem that the quota is not unlawful per se. For Section 7030) prohibits "preferential
treatment" where "an imbalance" may exist when one compares a particular work force
with the racial composition of the "area" or "community, State, section, or other area."
Title VII thus does not state that preferential treatment or a quota is unlawful where
discrimination rather than a mere imbalance is found to exist.
While the more crude quota demand which does not take into account relevant criteria
may leave Hughes intact for some purposes it would seem clearly inapplicable where
discrimination has been practiced or where the demand takes into account such factors
as the current extent of minority group participation, the availability of black workers
for employment and the impact of the demand upon the white incumbents. The emotive
quality of words like "quota" and "preferential treatment" obfuscate the need for "affirna-
tive action" against discrimination practices to be race conscious in devising remedies and
to seek out the minority group for employment. See Order Requiring Specific Goals for
Hiring Minorities in Better-Paying Philadelphia Construction Jobs issued by Labor Depart-
ment, June 27, 1969, Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Labor Fletcher to Heads
of All Agencies, June 27, 1969. For recent developments in this area see generally Bray,
Bucking Big Labor: Negro Drive for Jobs in Construction Unions is Gaining Monientuin,
The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 26, 1969, p. 1, col. 6. See also Local 53, International Ass'n
of Heat and Frost Insulators, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969); Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F.
Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Comm. Coll. Dist., 19 Ohio St.2d B5
(Ohio S. Ct. 1969). Cf. United States v. Montgomery Board of Ed., 37 U.S.L.W. 14161 (1969).
156. Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. Rtv. 574, 591 (1951). See
Gould, Book Review, COWNIONWIML, Apr. 25, 1969.
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Court's thinking on the picketing question. But the assumptions
engaged in are not applicable to civil rights picketing of the Hughes
type, aimed at potential customers or even to picketing by workers
engaged in walkouts to protest discriminatory employment conditions.
Certainly the characteristics of labor picketing noted by Professor Cox
have some relationship to the picketing that takes place within the
context of the Tanner-type dispute, but hardly enough to make applica-
ble the characteristics which Professor Cox noted. While it is possible
that black workers' organizations may eventually gain sufficient power
to exert the type of influence upon black workers which Professor Cox
notes with regard to labor unions, that day appears to be in the distant
future.
In the years since Hughes, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a
solicitude for civil rights picketing, sometimes referring to it as speech
in its most "pristine" form. r, One cannot ignore the possibility
that the freedom of association doctrine evolved in response to the
South's hostility toward the civil rights movement;3 will have some
relevance to the right of black workers to push their demands through
committees and civil rights organizations. One crucial problem is that
the black workers and civil rights protestors who are apt to be involved
in these disputes-unlike the mild, polite, self-restrained demonstrators
in the South who prompted wide admiration 159-will probably be
militant and their language abusiveIcO The cases should test clearly
the proposition that it is the duty of the police to control the hostile
audience rather than the speaker in the interest of protecting expres-
sion.1 61
157. Edw-ards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
158. See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.. 539 (1963); Bates v. City of
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Talley v. California, 262 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 US. 449 (1958).
159. See H. KALVEN, THE NEGRo 8: Isr AMNDMErT (1966).
160. See the language used in The Emporium, Trial E.xaminer's Decision, Cae No.
20-CA-5304, reported in Daily Labor Report, October 24, 1969, No. 207, D-1, which the
General Counsel referred to as in "common usage" in the "contemporary civil rights
struggle." Cf. NLRB v. Electrical Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953); Patterson-Sargent Co., 115
NLRB 1627 (1956).
161. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 37 U.S.L.W. 4213 (1969); Adderly v. Florida, 335
U.S. 39 (1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 US. 131 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US. 56
(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Fields v. South Carolina, 375 US.
44 (1963); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951); Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964); Kelly v. Page, 335 FX2d 114
(5th Cir. 1964). Cf. Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L.
REv. 177 (1966). Where labor unions are involved, the Court, at least formerly, does not
seem hesitant about protecting First Amendment picketing despite abusive language. See
Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 US. 293, 295 (1943).
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Conclusion
Two assumptions must underlie any approach to law and racial job
discrimination. The first is that legal tools are not presently achieving
their objectives. 1 2 If it has any effect at all, the existence of law with-
out enforcement simply antagonizes and embitters the class which it
is supposed to aid.
The second assumption is that self-help measures can be of assistance.
While the industrial relations system's concept of exclusive bargaining
rights for the majority has obvious merit and should be preserved, it
must be accomodated to the policies contained in civil rights legisla-
tion, policies designed to eliminate the exclusion of the black worker
and his interests from the bargaining table. The aim of this article is
not to divide black and white workers or to encourage industrial stop-
pages. On the contrary, the purpose of my proposals is to devise rules
of law which will encourage the union and management to be more
responsive to the grievances of minority groups and to create special
machinery which will bring dissident black workers into the collective
bargaining process. To say that legal rules which promote a degree of
independence for the black worker are at complete odds with the goals
of industrial peace is like arguing that the unions should not have
retained the right to strike under the National Labor Relations Act
because of its similar objectives. The labor movement knows full well
that peaceful substitutes for strife are more likely to be forthcoming
when the law favors economic pressure.
Even more important is the need to bring the black worker into
policy-making, elected positions on both the international and local
level. We will have domestic peace only when the races unite and
share power equitably. Unlike the case with business and "black
capitalism," black power in the industrial unions is, by sheer numerical
strength, within striking distance in many sectors.1 3
162. See, e.g., Jobs Panel Heads Finds Lag by Goal, N.Y. Times, July 21, 1969, at 50,
col. 1. Quacre, whether in light of the public importance of racial discrimination In
employment, picketing ought to be constitutionally protected except where misrepresenta-
tions are apparent of a type condemned in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US. 251
(1964); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
163. See Gould, Black Workers in White Unions, THE NATioN, Sept. 8, 1969, p. ',03.
Vol. 79: 46, 196q
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